DOJ Antitrust Division Dips Its Toe into Whistleblower Rewards

On July 8, 2025, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Antitrust Division announced its first-ever Whistleblower Rewards Program. The new program is a partnership with the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) designed to “incentivize[] individuals to report postal-related antitrust crimes that undermine the competitive process or market competition across industries.” The Whistleblower Rewards Program will provide financial rewards to individuals of up to 30% of any criminal fines recovered, for voluntarily reporting original, timely, and specific information regarding violations of law affecting USPS, its revenues, or its property if the reporting results in a recovery of at least $1 million.

The Antitrust Division program is part of a broader trend across DOJ to incentivize whistleblower reporting of criminal conduct. For example, on August 1, 2024, DOJ launched a Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program which provides rewards for original and truthful tips about certain types of corporate crime if the tip results in successful asset forfeiture. On May 19, 2025, DOJ announced the establishment of the Civil Rights Fraud Initiative, which uses the False Claims Act to investigate and pursue claims against any recipient of federal funds that knowingly violates federal civil rights laws, including through qui tam whistleblower actions. Likewise, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has a long-standing Whistleblower Program that provides monetary incentives for individuals to come forward with original information that leads to an SEC enforcement action in which over $1 million in sanctions is ordered.

The Antitrust Division’s program stands out from the others for two reasons. First, it is a collaboration among federal government entities: DOJ Antitrust Division, USPS, and the Office of Inspector General of USPS. A Memorandum of Understanding sets out the preliminary details and requirements of the Program. Second, the Whistleblower Rewards Program is limited to USPS. USPS historically has not been a victim of criminal antitrust behavior, so perhaps this new program represents the Division’s desire to test the waters of paying for information before rolling out the program more broadly. Or perhaps USPS was selected for this program because there is a statutory basis to pay whistleblowers in USPS-specific statutes – 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 404(a)(7) and 2601, which were enacted in 1970.¹

Notable requirements of the new program include the following:

• Information must be original, voluntarily communicated, and affect USPS:
  • Information is not considered original if, among other things, it was obtained through a communication subject to the attorney-client privilege, unless disclosure is permitted pursuant to the crime-fraud or other exception. Similarly, information is not considered original if it was obtained by executives or compliance personnel in connection with internal compliance or audit processes, with certain exceptions.
  • Information is not considered voluntarily communicated if it is in response to a formal demand, or where the whistleblower has a preexisting obligation in connection with a criminal investigation, prosecution, or civil enforcement action to report the information, including as part of an employer’s application to the Antirust Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy.
  • The Program only applies to information regarding violations of law “affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property” and that provides sufficient facts and evidence to conclude that USPS has “suffered an identifiable harm.” Further, “the harm need not be material or otherwise pose any substantial detriment to the Postal Service.” This broad language would likely sweep in conspiracies that directly impact USPS, including price fixing or bid rigging on the part of USPS contractors or suppliers, or market allocation agreements on the part of private logistics companies.
• Eligible Whistleblowers:
  • The program excludes whistleblowers who acquired the information provided to the Antitrust Division while they were employees, officials, or contractors of DOJ, USPS, law enforcement, or their close family members or members of their household.
  • The Program also excludes individuals who coerced the other party to participate in the illegal activity or who were clearly the leader or originator of the illegal activity. This condition echoes a condition of eligibility for the Antitrust Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy.
• Eligible criminal violations:
  • Eligible criminal violations, for the purposes of the Program, include the following:
    • Criminal violations of the Sherman Act, Sections 1, 2, and 3;
    • Federal criminal violations committed to effectuate, facilitate, or conceal violations of the Sherman Act;
    • Federal criminal violations targeting or affecting federal, state, or local public procurement; and,
    • Federal criminal violations targeting or affecting the conduct of federal competition investigations or proceedings.
• Determination of amount of reward:
  • If the Antitrust Division determines that a whistleblower reward is appropriate, the total reward will presumptively be at least 15% and a maximum of 30% of the recovered criminal fines. If multiple whistleblowers are eligible for a single award, the total shared award will not exceed 30% of the recovered criminal fine.
  • The Antitrust Division may consider a number of factors in determining the amount of the reward, including:
    • Whether the information provided was reliable, complete, resulted in the conservation of government resources, and directly related to and supported a successful criminal prosecution;
    • The extent of the whistleblower’s cooperation and assistance;
    • Whether the whistleblower faced any unique hardships as a result of his or her reporting the criminal activity and assisting the criminal investigation and prosecution;
    • Whether the whistleblower knowingly and willfully provided any false statement or withheld material or significant information;
    • Whether, and to what extent, the whistleblower participated in the criminal violation reported; and,
    • Whether the whistleblower received any award from any other government agency for reporting factually related conduct, or whether the whistleblower recovered in any related civil suit.

Companies operating in the healthcare and agricultural industries should take particular note of this announcement, as the Press Release specifically references those industries.² This aligns with other recent statements by DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission indicating increased antitrust scrutiny of these sectors.³

The Antitrust Division’s criminal program has slowed over the last decade. The number of criminal cases brought and fines collected dropped precipitously in 2017 and has not recovered to previous levels.⁴ Whether this new Whistleblower Program will result in increased prosecutions remains to be seen. The Antitrust Division has historically relied on its Conditional Leniency Program to incentivize self-reporting.⁵ How that program will interact in practice with the new Whistleblower Program is an open question.

Another uncertainty is how broadly DOJ will apply the Whistleblower Program to incentivize reporting. The Program applies to antitrust violations “affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property,” which is language taken directly from the statute authorizing this program. 39 U.S.C.A. § 404(a)(7). The Memorandum of Understanding provides no further guidance on the scope of the program, other than to note that the required harm need not be material or pose any substantial detriment to USPS. As noted above, this broad language would likely apply, at a minimum, to conspiracies that impact USPS, such as price fixing or bid rigging on the part of USPS contractors or suppliers, or market allocation agreements on the part of private logistics companies. It seems less likely to apply to conspiracies whose price-fixed goods are sent through USPS.

Despite these unknowns, the message from DOJ is clear: criminal antitrust enforcement is a priority. The key takeaway for clients is to invest in compliance. Now is the time to update compliance programs and training. O’Melveny has robust antitrust and white collar defense and government investigations practices with deep expertise in compliance and counseling.

¹ See 39 U.S.C. §§ 404(a)(7) (“Subject to the provisions of section 404a, but otherwise without limitation of the generality of its powers, the Postal Service shall have the following specific powers, among others…to offer and pay rewards for information and services in connection with violation of the postal laws, and, unless a different disposal is expressly prescribed, to pay one-half of all penalties and forfeitures imposed for violations of law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property, to the person informing for the same, and to pay the other one-half into the Postal Service Fund[.]”), 2601(a)(2) (“The Postal Service…shall collect and remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures arising out of matters affecting the Postal Service[.]”).

² “For the first time, the Antitrust Division will offer rewards for individuals who report antitrust crimes and related offenses that harm consumers, taxpayers, and free market competition across industries from healthcare to agriculture — under existing law and at no additional cost to the taxpayer.” Office of Public Affairs of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department's Antitrust Division Announces Whistleblower Rewards Program (July 8, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departments-antitrust-division-announces-whistleblower-rewards-program.

³ See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michael Kades Delivers Remarks on ‘Cattle Drives to Captive Supply, Competition in the Cattle Industry’ at R-CALF USA Annual Conference (June 21, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-michael-kades-delivers-keynote-remarks-cattle-drives; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Help us ensure access to fair and competitive healthcare markets for you and your family, https://www.justice.gov/atr/HealthyCompetition; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Testimony of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, 1-2, 19-24 (May 15, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/FTC-Chairman-Andrew-N-Ferguson-FSGG-Testimony-05-15-2025.pdf.

⁴ U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Enforcement Trends Charts (May 2, 2025),https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts.

⁵ See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Leniency Policy (April 25, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-policy.

This memorandum is a summary for general information and discussion only and may be considered an advertisement for certain purposes. It is not a full analysis of the matters presented, may not be relied upon as legal advice, and does not purport to represent the views of our clients or the Firm. Michael Tubach, an O’Melveny partner licensed to practice law in California and the District of Columbia; Mark A. Racanelli, an O’Melveny partner licensed to practice law in New York; Anna T. Pletcher, an O’Melveny partner licensed to practice law in California; Mia N. Gonzalez, an O’Melveny partner licensed to practice law in New York; Laura K. Kaufmann, an O’Melveny counsel licensed to practice law in California; and Brian P. Quinn, an O’Melveny counsel licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and Virginia, contributed to the content of this newsletter. The views expressed in this newsletter are the views of the authors except as otherwise noted.

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